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There is increased interest in the relationship between motor skills and social skills
in child development, with evidence that the mechanisms underlying these behaviors
may be linked. We took a cognitive approach to this problem, and examined the
relationship between four specific cognitive domains: theory of mind, motor skill, action
understanding, and imitation. Neuroimaging and adult research suggest that action
understanding and imitation are closely linked, but are somewhat independent of theory
of mind and low-level motor control. Here, we test if a similar pattern is shown in
child development. A sample of 101 primary school aged children with a wide ability
range completed tests of IQ (Raven’s matrices), theory of mind, motor skill, action
understanding, and imitation. Parents reported on their children’s social, motor and
attention performance as well as developmental concerns. The results showed that
action understanding and imitation correlate, with the latter having a weak link to motor
control. Theory of mind was independent of the other tasks. These results imply that
independent cognitive processes for social interaction (theory of mind) and for motor
control can be identified in primary school age children, and challenge approaches that
link all these domains together.
Keywords: social cognition, motor skill, theory of mind, imitation, action understanding
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive psychologists have traditionally studied human development within distinct domains.
For example, social cognition (often exemplified by theory of mind tasks) has been studied
separately from motor skill or visual skill. However, it is increasingly recognized that there may be
links in the brain and cognitive systems underlying these different types of skill. The present paper
aimed to examine the claim that motor and social skills develop in concert. To do this, we tested
a large sample of primary school age children on a number of cognitive tasks designed to target
theory of mind, mirror neuron systems, imitation and motor systems, and examined correlations
between performance in these different domains.
Mechanisms Underlying Motor and Social Behavior
In the present paper, we take a cognitive approach to development, meaning that we are
interested primarily in the information processing mechanisms underlying different behaviors.
We consider the information processing mechanisms of motor behavior, social behavior and all
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other behaviors including affect, language and perception, to
all fall within the realm of cognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga,
2004). We distinguish specific domains within this realm,
and are guided in this classification by our knowledge of
adult neuroscience. The present paper focuses on four distinct
domains: social cognition, motor cognition, imitation and mirror
neuron systems, which contribute in different ways to both motor
behavior and social behavior.
Tasks used to assess social cognition in children include
mentalizing (thinking about others’ thoughts), emotion and face
recognition, and many other aspects of social behavior. The
current study focuses on mentalizing in order to examine specific
claims about the relationship between mentalizing and mirror
neuron systems (Gallese et al., 2009; Hamilton, 2009). Tasks
commonly used to assess motor cognition include performing
hand actions, sequencing actions, whole body movements and
balance. The current study focuses on planning and sequencing
of hand actions, again because these are most closely linked to
mirror neuron systems (Tunik et al., 2007). Tasks used to assess
mirror neuron systems, which may contribute to both motor and
social behavior, include imitation tasks and action understanding
tasks. Developmentally, rapid improvements are seen in all of
these tasks over infancy with development continuing in the
primary school years (Bushnell and Boudreau, 1993; Jones, 2009).
Hypothesized Links between Cognitive
Domains
We can distinguish three different hypotheses for the relationship
between different cognitive domains: (1) independent domains,
(2) a single domain, and (3) domains interacting over
development, and we describe each hypothesis in turn. Other
hypotheses such as dynamical systems are also possible, but we
return to these in the discussion (McClelland, 2010).
The Independent Domains Hypothesis
Traditional neurocognitive approaches tend to view different
domains as independent. For example, different systems such
as language, mentalizing, and motor control were considered
largely distinct. In particular, mentalizing is considered as a
highly specialized skill drawing on abstract abilities such as
meta-representation (Perner, 1991) and quite unlike motor
skills. If this were the case, we would expect development of
mentalizing to be independent of development in motor control.
Neuroimaging data also suggest that the different social and
motor tasks described above draw on distinct brain networks.
Mentalizing tasks reliably activate a brain network including
medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction (Frith
and Frith, 2003). Tasks involving understanding of actions or
imitation typically activate a different brain network in the
inferior parietal and inferior frontal lobe (Caspers et al., 2010).
These brain regions are commonly referred to as the mirror
neuron system (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) and thus we will
describe the tasks that activate these areas as mirroring tasks.
Finally, motor tasks may engage mirror neuron systems but also
draw on cerebellum and basal ganglia (Middleton and Strick,
2000). Thus, the domains of mentalizing, mirroring and motor
control are at least partially distinct in terms of brain systems.
The present paper aims to test if they are also distinct in terms of
development.
The Single Domain Hypothesis
Even if brain and cognitive systems for mirroring and
mentalizing are distinct in adulthood, it is possible that they
develop from a single, primary system. For example, it has
recently been suggested that ‘action cognition’ provides a basis
for many different social-cognitive skills (Gallese et al., 2009).
Building on the discovery of mirror neurons, which respond
when a monkey performs an action and also sees another person
act, it has been suggested that performing and understanding
action is the developmental origin of human social skills. The
idea put forth by the action cognition theory is that proficiency
in social interactions fundamentally relies on the motor system
to decode the movements of others to allow for attributions
of intentions and mental states. The logic being employed
here is this; when we observe another person’s movement our
own motor system is activated in a way analogous to if we
were performing the same action ourselves. It is this activation
that allows us to introspect on what our intentions would be
if we were performing that action and this would allow an
inference about why the person is performing the action. Some
papers have made further claims linking the mirror neuron
system to empathy, theory of mind and social skills more
broadly (Gallese et al., 2004) including the failure of social skill
in autism (Rizzolatti et al., 2009). Under such a framework,
adequate development of motor and mirror systems (jointly) is
essential for the development of social skill, and there is a direct
causal relationship between the development of these cognitive
domains.
The Interactive Environment Hypothesis
A third hypothesis concerning the relationship between cognitive
domains in development is an environmentally mediated
hypothesis. This model sees the child’s development as a result
of the interaction between the child and the environment, where
changes to the environment can have a substantial effect on
development. Achievements in one domain could thus have
an impact on another domain via the environment. There is
growing evidence for such cross-domain interactions at various
developmental stages. For example, when a baby learns to sit
up, she can see the world differently and adults may address
her differently. This change in the environment may then
lead to advances in the infant’s social skills, compared to her
peers who are not yet able to sit. Evidence for this type of
interaction can be seen in the finding that babies who have not
yet learned to sit independently and those who have mastered
the skill are comparable on measures of face processing, while
those who are novice sitters perform worse, indicative of a
reorganization taking place within the face processing system
(Cashon et al., 2013). Another study finds that a baby who
is given more opportunities to actively engage with objects
shows an increase in orienting to faces relative to a baby given
only passive experience with non-social objects (Libertus and
Needham, 2011). Furthermore, crawling and walking in infants
leads to changes in social interaction from parents (Campos et al.,
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2000; Karasik et al., 2011) and improvements in language skills
(Iverson, 2010). Overall, the interactionist viewpoint predicts that
different cognitive domains may be linked, but the underlying
mechanism is external to the child. Such links may thus be
weaker than a directly shared brain mechanism, or might only
be measurable in longitudinal studies that track the child and her
environment over time.
Previous Studies of Social and Motor
Development
As this brief review summarizes, the domains of mentalizing,
mirroring, imitation and motor cognition could be unlinked,
directly linked or linked via the environment. There are few
previous studies of the development of motor and social skills
in typical children. One large project tested 390 primary school
children on fine and gross motor skills, theory of mind,
emotion processing, and cognitive control. They found the
motor skills correlated highly with IQ, language, social, and
attentional skills. Parent ratings of social behavior were related
to measured social skills but not motor skills (Dyck et al., 2004).
Several studies have examined the relationship between motor
and intellectual (not social) skills in children. For example,
scores from standardized measures of gross cognitive and gross
motor abilities are moderately and significantly correlated (Davis
et al., 2011). Further, this study found that this relationship
is largely accounted for by variances in visual processing and
fine manual control, suggesting that these domains may well
be linked via the environment. A number of studies have
not found any reliable relationship between tasks tapping
motor and social development, or links that are mediated by
other higher order cognitive abilities such as memory and
visual processing (Wassenberg et al., 2005; van der Fels et al.,
2014).
Many more studies have examined motor and social skills
in children with developmental disorders including autism and
developmental coordination disorder (DCD). Children with
autism are diagnosed on the basis of poor social skills, but up
to 80% of them also have DCD (Green et al., 2009). Infants at
risk of autism (due to having an older sibling with a diagnosis)
are reported to have poor postural control (Flanagan et al., 2012)
and difficulties with fine motor and grasping skills (Libertus
et al., 2014). Motor difficulties such as these have been found
to relate to later social and communicative ability (Bhat et al.,
2012; Leonard et al., 2014) but although motor impairments are
related to social abilities in autistic children, the relationship
does not stand in their unaffected siblings (Hilton et al., 2012).
In another study, autism severity as measured by scores on the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS), correlated with
a measure of praxis that includes imitation tests, but not with
more basic motor skills (Dziuk et al., 2007). Similarly, children
with DCD differ from their typical peers in their use of social
play (Kennedy-Behr et al., 2011). Additionally, autistic children’s
scores on motor control assessments such as the Movement
Assessment Battery for Children (M-ABC) or the Bruininks-
Oseretsky Test of Motor Proficiency, Second Edition (BOT-2)
predict the social behavior reported by parents (Hilton et al.,
2007). A comparison between a group of autistic children and
control groups matched for chronological age, motor skill, and
developmental age suggests the impairment in motor skill is
greater than would be expected based on ability alone (Staples
and Reid, 2010). Similarly, a prospective study of children with
DCD found that children with higher levels of motor clumsiness
at age 5 had fewer social pastimes at age 15 (Cantell et al.,
1994). These studies all suggest links between motor and social
abilities in developmental disorders. However, many of these
studies did not test specific components of motor and social
cognition, relying instead on reports of behavior from parents or
observations.
When more detailed cognitive assessments are carried out,
results seem more mixed. In one intriguing study, children who
were better able to adapt to lifting a heavy object also performed
better on theory of mind tasks (Sabbagh et al., 2010), an effect
that was not explained by age or executive function. Tests of
motor cognition in autism suggest poor motor planning (Hughes,
1996) and posture knowledge (Dowell et al., 2009) in some cases
but not others (Hamilton et al., 2007; van Swieten et al., 2010).
Some studies report difficulties in chaining actions together in
sequences (Cattaneo et al., 2007) but others do not (Pascolo and
Cattarinussi, 2012). Detailed testing of visuomotor adaptation in
children with autism did not find group differences (Mostofsky
et al., 2004; Gidley Larson et al., 2008).
Similar variability is found in studies of how children with
autism understand other people’s actions – a social component
of motor cognition. Some studies report difficulties in answering
questions about why a person did an action (Boria et al., 2009) or
in predicting what will come next in a movie (Zalla et al., 2010)
but other studies find no differences in the ability to make sense
of hand gestures (Hamilton et al., 2007). Studies of imitation
show intact performance on emulation tasks (copying the goal
of an action) but poor performance on mimicry tasks (copying
precise kinematic features; Hamilton, 2008; Edwards, 2014). For
example, when participants with autism performed a motor task
on a touch-screen computer that allowed careful matching of the
motor, attentional and memory demands between the conditions,
they still had poorer accuracy in the imitation condition
compared to the emulation condition (Stewart et al., 2013). There
is also a debate about how much imitation difficulties in autism
relate to a motor or a cognitive deficit (Vanvuchelen et al., 2007).
Overall, there is no single aspect of motor cognition that can be
directly linked to poor social cognition – more research is needed
to understand how motor and social developmental processes
mesh together.
The present paper aims to measure motor abilities and social
abilities in a large sample of children, using well-defined cognitive
tasks. We aim to go beyond assessments of a child’s everyday
behavior as measured in parent report or clinical measures. By
tracking specific cognitive processes, we will be able to make
much stronger links between the development of motor and
social skills, and the neurocognitive theories of their origins.
The present study uses a cross-sectional design, and thus cannot
provide a causal account of how strengths in one domain might
contribute to strengths in a different domain. However, it can
provide an initial measure of the strength of inter-domain links,
with a view to future longitudinal studies. In the following
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section, we set out and justify the tasks used in the present
study.
Testing Cognitive Development
To test for links between the motor, mirror and mentalizing
domains, we needed a set of cognitive tasks that could measure
children’s performance in each area. For the mentalizing domain,
we used theory of mind tasks, which have been well-studied
over the last 30 years. Performance on explicit tests of theory of
mind becomes reliable from about age 4 (for review see, Wellman
et al., 2001). Using a variety of tests with differing complexity,
developmental improvements can be traced from the age of
3 years up to 8 years or even into adolescence (Dumontheil et al.,
2010; Calero et al., 2013). In the present paper, we used a battery
of theory of mind tasks drawn from past work (Wellman and Liu,
2004) as our measure of mentalizing ability.
To measure the intersection of social and motor processes, we
used two types of task which, in adults, engage mirror neuron
systems in the brain, namely action understanding tasks and
imitation tasks (Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 2005). To
assess action understanding, we used a gesture recognition task
derived from studies of patients with apraxia (Mozaz et al., 2002)
in which a child must choose which photograph of a hand gesture
would best fill the gap in a cartoon action. We also used a grasp-
intention task in which a child must use a photograph of how an
object is grasped to decide ‘why’ the actor is holding the object –
to move it or to use it (Boria et al., 2009). To assess imitation
abilities, we instructed children to imitate a series of hand/arm
actions and measured accuracy. Instructed imitation is likely to
be a better measure of mirror system function than the propensity
to spontaneously imitate (Vivanti, 2015).
Cognitive tests of motor systems are also not easy to find.
Studies have traditionally focused on the performance of tasks
relevant to daily life, such as walking or writing (Sugden, 2007).
Here we aimed to retain a cognitive focus and use tasks that
can be linked to specific motor processes, including motor
planning, sequencing and prediction. Thus, we used a bar task
which requires the child to consider the end posture in an
action sequence before beginning to move – a measure of motor
planning (Cohen and Rosenbaum, 2004; Rosenbaum et al., 2006).
Motor planning skills improve over 3–10 years-old age range
(Stöckel et al., 2012; Weigelt and Schack, 2015). We also used a
sequencing task (Harrington and Haaland, 1992) which assessed
how long it took to switch between different actions rather than
performing the same action repeatedly.
The Present Study
The present study aimed to measure specific cognitive processes
underlying motor and social skill in primary school age children,
and to determine how they develop together. We used several
tasks to measures performance in four different cognitive
domains – of theory of mind, action understanding, imitation
and motor control, as detailed above. The present paper focuses
only on the domain-level of analysis because the theories that
motivated this study are specified at that level. Analysis of
performance on individual tasks within each domain will be
presented in a different paper. We tested a large sample of
children (n = 101) to obtain good statistical power. A power
analysis shows that obtaining a medium effect size with 95%
power in a multiple regression with seven predictors requires
a sample size of 89 participants. If motor and cognitive skills
develop from distinct cognitive systems, then performance on
the theory of mind tasks will not be related to performance on
the mirroring or motor tasks. In contrast, if the engagement of a
single cognitive system (such as the mirror neuron system) drives
both motor and social development, then the different cognitive
domains will correlate tightly across participants. If motor and
social skills are linked only via environmental effects, then weak
correlations between domains may be observed as well as with IQ.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We invited children aged between 4 and 12 years-old to
participate in the project. Families were contacted through local
primary schools and a database of people interested in research.
All parents completed an informed consent form before their
children took part, and the study was approved by the University
of Nottingham School of Psychology ethics board.
For the first phase of the project, parents of 188 children
completed four questionnaires – the Developmental
Coordination Disorder Questionnaire (DCDQ; Wilson and
Crawford, 2010), The Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS;
Constantino and Gruber, 2005) and the Conners 3 ADHD
index (Conners 3AI; Conners, 2008), as well as a family
background questionnaire collecting data on child’s age,
languages spoken, socioeconomic status (based on parents’ jobs)
and any developmental concerns about their child. A more
detailed analysis of this phase of the project will be reported
elsewhere.
Of the 188 children, 101 participated in the second phase of
this project which involved detailed cognitive testing. Data from
all 101 is reported here. This sample was not selected entirely
at random. First, the availability of children and schools for
testing constrained the choice of participants. Second, children
whose scores on either the SRS or the DCDQ were toward
either end of the distribution of scores obtained from the phase
one sample were deliberately oversampled. This is because a
fully random sample would include many children with mid-
range scores. By oversampling children with extreme scores, we
maximized the variance in abilities among the children tested
and increased our power to detect associations between the
different measures in our study. None of the children tested had a
formal diagnosis of developmental delay, but some were receiving
additional support from their school or undergoing assessments
for difficulties.
Cognitive Testing
The 101 children who completed cognitive testing were assessed
by a trained researcher in a quiet room at their school or at the
University of Nottingham. They completed the following tasks
spread over 2–4 sessions.
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Mentalizing Assessment
This included widely used theory of mind tasks – the diverse
desires task, diverse beliefs task, knowledge access task, explicit
false-belief task, implicit false-belief task, and contents false-belief
task were used as in Hamilton et al. (2007). A child was given
1 point for each task where they passed control questions and
demonstrated theory of mind. Children completed six sequences
of a picture-sequencing task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986) and
were given 1 point for each fully correct answer and a score
of 0.5 was given if the final picture of a sequence was correct
but the second and third were in the wrong order. Children
completed six trials of a penny-hiding task (Gratch, 1964) which
is an interactive measure of strategic mentalizing. The child was
given one point for each appropriate attempt to hide a coin from
the experimenter. Scores for all the theory of mind tasks (six
classic tasks, six picture sequencing trials, and six penny hiding
trials) were totaled for each child. The data were then linearly
scaled so that the sample mean was 0 and standard deviation
was 1. Inspection of the quantile plots in R showed no substantial
deviation from normality so no further data transformations were
applied.
Mirror System Assessment
This included tests of imitation, intention understanding and
posture knowledge. In the imitation task, the experimenter sat
opposite the child and asked the child to watch the action and
then to copy as closely as possible as if looking in a mirror.
The experimenter demonstrated with the hand mirroring the
child’s dominant hand, and the child used his/her dominant
hand to respond. One practice trial was given to ensure the
instructions were understood. Children performed six trials with
meaningful actions and six with meaningless actions (blocked,
with block order counterbalanced) and performance was scored
from video. Two trained raters coded all videos for overall
imitation quality (0, 1, or 2) and specific error types, but only
the former are reported here. Reasonable inter-rater reliability
was achieved (Cohen’s weighted kappa was 0.75). Quality scores
were summed for each child and averaged across raters, giving
a score out of 24. As before, data were linearly scaled to have
a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Inspection of the
quantile plots in R showed deviation from normality that was best
corrected with by squaring the values, so this transformation was
applied.
The intention understanding task was based on Boria et al.
(2009). New picture stimuli were generated showing a hand
touching, lifting or using a variety of everyday objects. Stimuli
were piloted with typical adults to ensure that the objects and
actions could be clearly identified. On each trial, the child
first saw a card with a picture of an everyday object and
was asked – what is it? Responses were 99.7% correct. Then
the child was asked if the hand was holding or touching the
object. For the holding images, the child was asked – why is
he holding it? To use it or to move it? 10 different objects
were photographed, resulting in 10 hold-to-use photos and 10
hold-to-move photos. Responses to the ‘why’ question for each
of these 20 photos were scored with 1 point for each correct
answer, giving a score out of 20. The posture knowledge task
was identical to that used by Hamilton et al. (2007). On each
trial, the children saw a cartoon of a person performing an action
with the hands missing, together with three photos of hands
in different postures and were asked ‘which hands fill the gap?’
Correct responses were given 1 point with a total score out of
16. Scores on the intention understanding task and the posture
knowledge task were summed for each child. As before, data were
linearly scaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of
1. Inspection of the quantile plots in R showed no substantial
deviation from normality so no further data transformation was
applied.
Motor Assessment
This included two tasks – a test of motor planning and a
test of motor sequencing. The motor planning task was based
on Rosenbaum et al. (1990), and previously used in autism
research (Hughes, 1996; Hamilton et al., 2007). On each trial,
the child saw a bar with two ends of different colors resting
horizontally on a rest 10 cm above the table, and two targets
(paper disks on the table) of different colors. They were asked
to place one end of the bar on one of the targets (e.g., place
the red end on the black target). On four trials, this could
be comfortably achieved by grasping the bar at the start of
the trial with an overhand grip, while on four trials the less-
common underhand grip was more appropriate. Typical adults
are able to plan their movements to end in a comfortable posture
by adopting a less-common posture at the start of the action
(Rosenbaum et al., 2006) and this ability develops over childhood
(Adalbjornsson et al., 2008). Thus, this task assesses motor
planning. Children received a score out of 8 with one point for
each trial where the appropriate grip was used. Motor planning
scores were linearly scaled to have a mean of 0 and standard
deviation of 1.
The motor sequencing task was based on Harrington and
Haaland (1992), and aimed to assess motor speed and the ability
to switch between actions. The apparatus was a set of black
boxes each with one movable part – a switch to flick, a button
to push or a dial to twist. On each trial, the experimenter
prepared an array of five of these boxes in a specific order (e.g.,
flick, twist, twist, flick, flick). When the child was ready with
his/her hand on the start location on the left of the desk, the
experimenter revealed the array of boxes and the child moved
his/her hand along the array performing each action in turn.
Trials were videoed and the time from moving away from the
start-location to moving away from the last action was coded.
40% of videos were second scored and the correlation between
the two scorers was r = 0.93. Some box sequences contained no
transitions (e.g., push-push-push-push) while others contained
one, two, three or four transitions (e.g., push-twist-push-twist-
push). Data were analyzed by fitting each child’s movement time
on each trial to a linear model with five predictors: one for each
action (flick/push/twist), one for transition time (coded 1 for
switch and 0 for a stay) and one for learning (a linear decrease
over the 15 trials). Outliers in these parameter estimates were
identified as values 3 standard deviation above/below the mean
(n = 8 out of 404 data points) and replaced with the group
mean.
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To combine the motor task scores into a single score for each
child, the following transformations were applied. First, values
for each score (motor planning; flick-time; push-time; twist-time;
transition time; learning) were linearly scaled so that each full
set of scores had a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The
combined motor score was then defined as: – (flick-time + push-
time + twist-time)/3 + motor planning – transition time using
the linearly scaled scores for each. Timing values were negative
to ensure that larger values reflect better performance, consistent
with other data in this analysis. Inspection of quantile plots
showed no substantial deviation from normality so no further
data transformation was applied.
IQ Assessment
Raven’s colored progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998)
were used to measure each child’s non-verbal IQ (nvIQ).
Raw scores (not normed scored) were then linearly
scaled to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of
1, in line with other data in this analysis. Inspection of
the quantile plots in R showed no substantial deviation
from normality so no further data transformation was
applied.
Parent Report Scores
Parents completed the SRS, the DCDQ and Conners 3 AI
scale. Scores on these scales correlated highly, and a detailed
analysis of these data will be reported elsewhere. Descriptive
statistics on the raw scores are presented in Table 1 to illustrate
the sample of children tested here. The present study focused
on cognitive performance, so we combined the parent report
scores into a single factor reflecting parent concerns. To create
the factor, we first inspected the raw scores on each of the
three parent-report instruments (SRS, DCDQ and Conners)
using quantile plots in R. DCD-Q scores were then squared to
reduce the deviation from normality. SRS scores and Conners
scores were inverted so that a larger value indicates better
performance (to be consistent with all other measures). Each
transformed score was then linearly scaled to have a mean of
0 and standard deviation of 1, and the scores were summed
for each child. This gives a combined parent-report measure
that weights social, motor and attentional concerns equally,
TABLE 1 | Characteristics of 101 participants.
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 7.88 1.69 4.88 11.55
SES 3.13 1.5 1 9
Attention (Conners) 5.4 6.0 0 20
Motor skill (DCDQ) 56.6 14.2 16 75
Social development (SRS) 40.9 31.8 0 145
nvIQ (Raven’s raw score) 25.4 6.6 11 36
Handedness 10 left 3 ambidextrous 88 right
Gender 60 male 41 female
Any parental concern about
possible developmental issues
76 no 35 yes
and which gives higher values to children showing better
performance across these domains. Each child’s primary caregiver
was asked for their current occupation and responses were coded
using the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ILO, 2012) where higher values indicate lower socioeconomic
status.
Statistical Analysis
Data for 101 children were available. As described above,
scores on each individual task were transformed to ensure
that the data were normally distributed and linearly scaled to
ensure that higher values reflect better performance. This gave
summary scores for each of the following domains: theory
of mind; imitation; mirroring; motor skill; non-verbal IQ;
parent report; together with age and gender data for each
child. The correlations between each of these sets of summary
scores were calculated. Then four general linear models (GLMs)
were set up to test which factors predicted each of the four
cognitive domains of interest. For example, the Theory of
Mind model tested how their imitation score, mirroring score,
motor score, nvIQ, parent score, age and gender, predicted
a child’s Theory of Mind score. The imitation model tested
how their ToM score, mirroring score, motor score, nvIQ,
parent score, age and gender, predicted a child’s imitation score.
Effectively, these models tested whether performance in each
cognitive domain was accounted for by general effects (e.g.,
nvIQ) or if performance was closely linked to another cognitive
domain.
To further probe the data, we conducted a number of
exploratory analyses. First, we excluded all children for whom
parents had indicated a developmental concern, that is, all
children who are receiving additional help at school or
undergoing assessments for a developmental disorder. Then we
re-ran the GLM models on the remaining sample of typical
children. This checks if our results are driven only by the
atypical children in the sample. Second, we split the sample
into 3 age bands with equal numbers of children in each band.
We then re-ran the GLM models on these three samples. This
checks if links between different domains might be apparent
in only some age ranges. However, both these analyses are
conducted on smaller samples and have reduced statistical
power.
To explore cross-domain links in the full sample without
confounds of age, we examined correlations between the residuals
of each domain after removing effects of age, non-verbal IQ
and gender. Specifically, we set up a GLM predicting theory
of mind performance as a function of age, non-verbal IQ and
gender. We took the residuals from this model as a measure
of each child’s theory of mind performance after age, gender
and IQ effects are removed. In the same way, we set up three
separate GLMs of mirroring performance; motor performance
and imitation each as functions of age, non-verbal IQ and gender.
We took the residuals of all four models and examine the
pattern of correlations between them. This gives insight into the
relationship between different cognitive domains across the full
sample of 101 children but without any confounding effects of
age or IQ.
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RESULTS
Correlations
The correlations between all the scores in the complete
dataset are illustrated in Figure 1. Note that correction
for multiple comparisons has not been applied, but an
appropriate Bonferroni threshold for 21 comparisons would
be p < 0.002. Correlations between almost all measures
were high; with the exception that parent questionnaire
scores did not correlate with motor scores, theory of
mind scores or age, using the corrected significance
threshold.
General Linear Models
Four GLM analyses were performed, to test the relationship
between performance on the cognitive tasks and parent report
in different domains. Results of these analyses are presented
in Table 2. Model 1 found that theory of mind scores could
be predicted based on age and non-verbal IQ but were not
related to motor, imitation or mirror system performance.
Model 2 found that motor scores could be predicted from
gender and non-verbal IQ, with imitation skill as a marginal
predictor. Note that this model had a weaker overall fit (adjusted
R2 = 0.28) than any of the other models. Model 3 found
that mirror system scores could be predicted from imitation
scores and non-verbal IQ, but motor and theory of mind
scores did not contribute. Model 4 showed that imitation
scores could be predicted from age, parent questionnaires
FIGURE 1 | Correlations between all variables. In the upper triangle, each
dot represents one participant and the line-of-best-fit is shown in red. In the
lower triangle, values are Pearson’s r. ∗ indicates correlations meeting the
p < 0.002. Bonferroni corrected threshold. ∗∗ indicates correlations at
p < 0.00001. ∗∗∗ indicates correlations at p < 0.0000001.
TABLE 2 | Results of the GLM analyses performed to test the relationship
between performance on the cognitive tasks and parent report measures.
b SE t ß p
Model 1: Theory of Mind
Overall model F = 12.69, df = 7,93, p < 0.0001, adj r2 = 0.45
Intercept −0.96 0.50 −1.92 −0.96 0.058
Gender −0.09 0.16 −0.54 −0.09 0.592
Age 0.13 0.06 2.09 0.13 0.039∗
Parent Questionnaires 0.03 0.03 0.99 0.03 0.325
Motor 0.05 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.350
Imitation 0.12 0.11 1.19 0.13 0.237
MNS 0.10 0.07 1.50 0.10 0.137
Non-verbal IQ 0.26 0.10 2.63 0.26 0.010∗
Model 2: Motor
Overall model F = 6.53, df = 7,93, p < 0.0001, adj r2 = 0.28
Intercept −1.01 1.06 −0.95 −1.01 0.343
Gender −0.79 0.32 −2.48 −0.79 0.015∗
Age 0.19 0.13 1.45 0.19 0.150
Parent Questionnaires −0.07 0.07 −1.01 −0.07 0.313
ToM 0.20 0.22 0.94 0.20 0.350
Imitation 0.37 0.22 1.72 0.37 0.089
MNS −0.06 0.14 −0.41 −0.06 0.682
Non-verbal IQ 0.41 0.21 1.99 0.42 0.049∗
Model 3: Mirroring
Overall model F = 13.76, df = 7,93, p < 0.0001, adj r2 = 0.47
Intercept −1.21 0.79 −1.52 −1.21 0.132
Gender 0.01 0.25 0.05 0.01 0.961
Age 0.15 0.10 1.56 0.15 0.122
Parent Questionnaires 0.05 0.05 0.94 0.05 0.352
ToM 0.24 0.16 1.50 0.24 0.137
Motor −0.03 0.08 −0.41 −0.03 0.682
Imitation 0.48 0.16 3.02 0.48 0.003∗∗
Non-verbal IQ 0.41 0.16 2.62 0.41 0.010∗
Model 4: Imitation
Overall model F = 13.49, df = 7,93, p < 0.0001, adj r2 = 0.47
Intercept −1.67 0.47 −3.56 −1.67 0.001
Gender 0.24 0.15 1.55 0.24 0.125
Age 0.19 0.06 3.34 0.19 0.001∗∗
Parent Questionnaires 0.07 0.03 2.18 0.07 0.032∗
ToM 0.12 0.10 1.19 0.12 0.237
Motor 0.08 0.05 1.72 0.08 0.089
MNS 0.19 0.06 3.02 0.19 0.003∗∗
Non-verbal IQ −0.10 0.10 −1.00 −0.10 0.318
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
and mirror system scores, with motor scores as a marginal
predictor.
Overall, the correlation analysis and the GLM models provide
a consistent picture. Imitation and mirror system performance
are related to each other, and are weakly linked to motor skill.
Theory of mind scores are linked to nvIQ but not to any of the
motor scores. To summarize these results, we illustrate the factors
which reliably predict performance in each of the four cognitive
domains in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of significant effects found. The four cognitive
domains are listed across the centre. Each solid arrow indicates a factor
which predicted performance in that cognitive domain. Each dashed arrow
indicates a marginally significant predictor.
Further Exploratory Analyses
We performed several exploratory analyses to check the
robustness of our results. First, we implemented the four GLM
models on the data from the 76 children for whom there was
no parental report of any developmental concerns. Results for
the ToM model showed that parent report scores were a reliable
predictor of performance (p = 0.039) but no other predictors
were significant. Results for the Motor model showed that gender
(p = 0.034) and nvIQ (p = 0.026) were reliable predictors,
replicating the pattern found in the full sample. Results for
the mirroring model showed that imitation (p = 0.0049) and
nvIQ (p = 0.027) were reliable predictors, replicating the pattern
found in the full sample. Results for the Imitation model
showed that age (p = 0.034), parent reports (p = 0.028) and
Mirroring (p = 0.0049) were reliable predictors, replicating the
pattern found in the full sample. Thus, the analysis of data
from only children with no developmental concerns gave a very
similar pattern to the full data sample, with no indication of
stronger relationships between cognitive domains in this more
homogenous sample.
Second, we split the data into three sub-samples by age: a
young group of 33 children aged 4.8–6.7 years; a mid-aged
group of 33 children aged 6.8–9 years and an old group of 34
children aged 9–11.5 years. We implemented the GLM models
on data from each sub-sample separately. In these 12 GLMs,
the only predictors meeting the p < 0.05 threshold were: in the
young group, nvIQ predicts mirroring performance; in the mid-
aged group, Mirroring, Imitation, and Motor performance were
all reliable predictors of each other; in the old group, Ravens
predicted motor performance and age predicted mirroring
performance. There were no indications of strong relationships
between the specific cognitive domains that differ from our main
report in these subsamples, though we note that these analyses
are likely to be underpowered.
Third, we aimed to examine each cognitive domain without
confounding effects of age and IQ. To do this, we modeled
performance in each of the four cognitive domains separately
as a function of age, non-verbal IQ, and gender. We took
the residuals from each model as measures of each child’s
TABLE 3 | Results of the residuals correlation.
ToM Motor Imitation MNS Parent report
ToM 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.16
Motor 0.248 0.17 0.03 −0.04
Imitation 0.019 0.089 0.36 0.26
MNS 0.020 0.802 0.000 0.19
Parent report 0.117 0.661 0.009 0.054
Upper triangle indicates correlation coefficient, lower triangle indicates p-values.
domain performance without any age, gender or IQ effects.
We took the residuals of all four models and examined the
pattern of correlations between them. This gives insight into the
relationship between different cognitive domains across the full
sample of 101 children but without any confounding effects of
age or IQ. Correlations in this model were given in Table 3.
The only correlation which survives an appropriate correction
for multiple comparisons (p < 0.005) is the correlation between
imitation and mirroring, a result also found in our primary
analysis.
DISCUSSION
In this study of 101 children, we examined cognitive performance
across the motor and social domains. We found that
performance on theory of mind tasks was independent of
action understanding, imitation, and motor skill. However,
action understanding and imitation were closely related, and
somewhat linked to motor skill. These results have important
implications for theories of how different cognitive domains
develop and are related to one another.
In the introduction, we set out three possible models for
the relationship between social and motor skills. These skills
could develop independently, they could be fully integrated or
they could be linked via the environment. The present data
do not give support to a wholly integrated model (hypothesis
2) such as the action cognition framework set out by Gallese
et al. (2009). With that theory comes the testable hypothesis
that performance on tasks tapping motor cognition, the mirror
neuron system and social cognition will all be necessarily
related. In our data, imitation and action understanding were
closely linked, and weakly correlated to motor cognition.
This supports the claim that the process of understanding
another agent’s action involves the recruitment of a perception-
action network. However, the social abilities measured with
theory of mind tasks were independent of mirror and motor
skills. This argues against the hypothesis that difficulties in
social cognition cascade downstream from impaired motor
cognition, or that shared understanding of perception and action
contributes to mentalizing. It remains possible that social and
motor cognition could be more integrated at earlier stages of
development than was considered by the present study and
it may be that it becomes increasingly modularized across
development or the relationship may differ when different
components of motor cognition are considered (e.g., Sabbagh
et al., 2010).
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In contrast, our data align well with the cognitive task
distinctions suggested by adult neuroimaging data and by
traditional cognitive theories. In neuroimaging studies, action
understanding and imitation engage the same brain systems;
partially overlapping with other motor skills, while theory of
mind engages different systems. Similarly, in our developmental
data, action understanding and imitation are mutually predictive,
and have a weak relationship to motor skill.
Our data cannot rule out the possibility that different
cognitive domains interact over developmental time, linked by
the environment. There is evidence for this in some longitudinal
studies. For example, questionnaire data from over 62,000
children as part of a cohort study revealed that motor skill at
18 months predicted communication skills at 3 years (Wang
et al., 2014). Bart et al. (2007) found that motor skills in
kindergarten predicted study skills and disruptive behavior (but
barely predicted social behavior) a year later. Ommundsen et al.
(2010) found that motor skill in 1st grade predicted social
status in 4th grade, measured in 80 children. Note that all these
studies used self-report or teacher report measures of social
behavior, rather than cognitive tests. Thus, it remains unclear if
motor cognition can be directly linked to social cognition in a
longitudinal fashion.
Our data also cannot rule out the possibility that there are links
between performance on specific tasks within different cognitive
domains, which does not emerge when performance in each
domain is combined as we have done here. For example, Davis
et al. (2011) found that subscores in tests of visual processing
and fine manual control were correlated in a group of 4–
11 years-old children and that this task-level effect drove the
link between motor and intelligence domains. It is possible that
there are similar relationships between specific tasks in our study,
but unfortunately there are too many tasks and not enough
participants to implement the PCA or task-level analysis used by
Davis et al. (2011). It would be interesting to test if specific tasks
or specific cognitive sub-components are linked across domains
in future work.
Clinical Relevance
The results of the present study have implications for how
we understand disorders of both social and motor cognition.
For instance, if motor and social skills develop independently
of each other, as the data presented here suggest, then it is
not clear why there is such a high degree of co-morbidity
of autism and DCD. The present study did not test children
with a diagnosis of autism or DCD, but some children were
undergoing assessments for a variety of developmental concerns.
This enabled us to test a larger and more variable sample.
However, without participants diagnosed with disorders, it is not
possible to know if the same relationships between motor and
social skills hold on that sample. It is possible, for example, that
motor cognition and theory of mind are closely linked in autism
even if they are not linked in a typical sample. It is possible that
the relationship is qualitatively different in atypical populations
and that cognitive systems may be more interdependent and
have increasing cascade effects on each other. Alternatively, it
may be that an underlying neurological susceptibility to cognitive
delay or deficit may similarly affect abilities that are reasonably
unrelated in typical development.
The independence between mentalizing ability and motor
cognition in this study has implications for the design of
interventions for those who are at a social or motoric
disadvantage. For example, there have been studies exploring
the effects of interventions targeting imitation skill in autism to
improve social emotional functioning (Ingersoll, 2012). While
Ingersoll found improvements in social emotional functioning
when children were followed-up were related to treatment it was
not clear that improvements in imitation was the mechanism
through which these improvements were manifest.
Strengths and Weaknesses
This study is limited in some ways. Most of our experimental
measures were based on previously published work, to ensure
robustness. However, our measure of motor sequencing was
novel and has not previously been used with children. The
sequencing task requires children to complete a series of actions,
where the number of switches from one action type to another
can vary. Reaction time was measured from video coding which
may also have introduced an element of error. Furthermore,
the novelty of this task makes it difficult to determine what
optimal performance should look like. Some of the measures used
produced some ceiling effects and so were not capturing the full
variance that exists in the population for these measures. This was
particularly the case for the Theory of Mind tasks and despite
normalizing the distribution it may be that the distribution of
scores would have had greater variance in a younger sample or if
more implicit measures of mentalizing were used. Furthermore,
the questionnaires used to measure parental reports of a child’s
behaviors are designed to be used as screening measures for
differentiating children who potentially have a clinical diagnosis
from those who do not and as such they were not designed to
measure ability equally across the entire range of typical social,
motor and attentional ability.
There are also several statistical and analysis issues which
could affect our conclusions. First, our sampling strategy involved
selecting children for cognitive testing who had extreme scores
on the parent report measures, in order to maximize the variance
in our sample. While none of the children in our sample have
a clinically diagnosed developmental disorder, it is possible
that this sampling method could bias our results if there are
discontinuities between typical and atypical development. The
fact that we find similar results when we analyze data only
from children with no developmental concerns argues that our
sampling method did not introduce strong biases into our
analysis. Second, it is possible that performance in different
cognitive domains changes non-linearly with age. Our analysis
uses only linear models and cannot capture this. Substantially
larger sample sizes would be needed to examine non-linear age
effects. Finally, we tested children across a wide age range but
did not have enough participants to break down the dataset
into smaller, more homogenous groups to test if the relationship
between cognitive domains changes over development.
This study did, however, have some areas of strength. First, the
large sample offered good statistical power to detect relationships
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between multiple variables. The results we found are consistent
in both our primary GLM analysis, which takes a conservative
approach to testing for strong relationships between cognitive
domains, and in three further exploratory analyses which tested
for these relationships in sub-samples of the data. Second, the
present study employed cognitive tasks that were measuring
children’s abilities in certain domains rather than their parent’s
perception of their ability relative to normative performance.
This is a very important distinction as it allows for a more
fine-grained exploration of the component aspects of cognition
that would be too difficult to elicit in questionnaires. The
relationship between parent measures in these domains with
children’s performance on related tasks from the current sample
will be explored in more detail elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The data presented in the current study suggest that different
domains of social and motor skill, specifically the theory
of mind domain and the mirroring domain, are relatively
independent in this sample. This argues against a ‘single
domain hypothesis,’ but is compatible with an ‘independent
domains’ hypothesis or an ‘interactive environment’ hypothesis.
Longitudinal data will be needed to discriminate and further
test these hypotheses, and thus to better understand the ways
in which different cognitive processes interact across motor and
social development. This is especially the case in developmental
disorders when the development of these cognitive capacities
may be incommensurate with each other and in turn with
the requirements of the environment, leading to functional
impairment. Intervention studies should be used to not only
address questions of efficacy and effectiveness at improving
motor and social proficiency but also in order to test the
mechanisms through which social and motor skill develop
in concert or autonomously. We suggest that future research
should adopt a cognitive approach to the measurement of
motor skill, mirror neuron system functioning, and social
cognition in clinical and non-clinical control groups in order
to test and develop our understanding of the mechanisms of
development.
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